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In this essay, I situate Irigaray’s philosophy of sexuate difference between the Heideggerian response 
to the collapse of the project of western modernity (“only a god can save us”) and that of decolonial 
theorist Oscar Guardiola-Riviera (“only Indians can save our modern soul”). First, I return to 
Heidegger’s theorization of “planetary technicity” as the ontology of modernity arguing, with 
Heidegger, that in order to respond to this problem we must return to the question of Being. From 
here, I link Heidegger’s theory of technicity with the work of decolonial theory on the “coloniality of 
Being,” suggesting that one reason for Heidegger’s pessimism is that he did not think technicity 
from beyond a Eurocentric perspective. The recent “ontological turn” in decolonial anthropology 
that seeks to study indigenous thought as ontology, however, shows that there are resources for 
thinking beyond the onto-logic of technicity. Yet, here, I return to Irigaray’s critique of Heidegger 
for his forgetting of sexuate difference in his analysis of technology to say that a move to a 
decolonial ontology beyond planetary technicity can only take place if we go through an ontology of 
sexual difference: because, as Irigaray shows, the onto-logic of technicity that underwrites coloniality 
and modernity begins in an ontological annihilation of life, sexuate difference, and the maternal 
debt, the only way to recover this is by thinking the question of sexuate difference. Finally, I 
conclude by examining the case of the Kogi peoples of Colombia who have warned westerners that 
the destruction of the planet can only be stopped if we learn to recompense our common Mother. 
This case, I suggest, shows how and why the turn to non-western ontologies as a way out of the 
death project of modern technicity must reckon with the work of Irigaray. 
 
 
Stephen D. Seely is a doctoral candidate in Women’s & Gender Studies at Rutgers University. He 
works on questions of ontology, life, and sex in feminist, continental, and decolonial philosophy. He 
has published articles on affect theory, queer theory, sexual ethics, and ontology as well as a co-
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IRIGARAY BETWEEN GOD AND THE INDIANS  
SEXUATE DIFFERENCE, DECOLONIALITY, AND THE POLITICS OF ONTOLOGY 
“There is no possible negotiation regarding life: life is or is not. The question is how can we cultivate what life is. As life 
can never be treated as an object, our culture does not supply us with a method to answer this question.”  
-LUCE IRIGARAY1 
 
 
1. Whither the Saving Power? 
“Only a god can save us now,” declared Martin Heidegger in 1966 as he entered the final decade of 
his life.2 As he saw it, the world had plunged into a nihilism that he identified with the “planetary 
domination” of technicity—the positioning of all that is as resources in a universal standing reserve 
to be ordered and arranged by technical-scientific rationality. This state of affairs, for Heidegger, is a 
direct result of the death of God in European modernity: the annihilation of the suprasensory realm 
of value that had structured western metaphysics since Plato had given way to a world that is entirely 
the product of a human will to power. Thus, Heidegger recognized that even our attempts to 
mitigate our own destruction—nuclear disarmament, development initiatives, environmental 
conservation efforts—were taking the form of an instrumental calculation and management that 
only further chain us to technicity as the constant fabrication of the world. While the death of the 
metaphysical God could have had a liberatory effect, it has instead conscripted us into a planetary 
network in which we are “posed, enjoined, and challenged by a power that becomes manifest in the 
essence of technicity.”3 Only a god can save us, then, because only a god can restore us to a world 
                                                     
1 Luce Irigaray and Michael Marder, Through Vegetal Being: Two Philosophical Perspectives (Columbia 
University Press 2016) 19. 
2 Martin Heidegger, ‘“Only a God Can Save Us”: The Spiegel Interview’ (trans William Richardson) in 
Thomas Sheehan (ed) Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker (Precedent Publishing 1981) 45 at 57. In the 
case of all translated texts, translations have occasionally been modified in consultation with the 
original. 
3 As above at 58. 
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that is not entirely of our own possession and production, to the mystery of belonging to something 
that is out of our control, to forms of creative expression that reveal Being in new ways. For the late 
Heidegger, the only task left for thinking is to return to the question that western metaphysics never 
thought and that cannot be thought by technical-scientific rationality: the question of Being as 
irreducible to any being (even to God).  
Given this, it certainly would have come as no surprise to Heidegger, who in 1939 had 
already defined the modern age as the age of the “conquest” of the world as the sum total of “man’s 
representing productions,” that our epoch would one day be designated as the Anthropocene.4 And 
although climate scientists have made it clear that we no longer have the luxury of time to poetize 
while awaiting the coming god, the fact that techno-scientific rationality appears to be the only 
possible way of thinking climate change should make us pause long enough to consider that perhaps 
Heidegger’s message was not so far off base. Indeed, how else are we to understand the now-
prevalent dictum that continental philosophy must adapt itself to the sciences if it is to have any 
relevance in the contemporary world except in terms of Heidegger’s prediction of the impending 
‘dissolution of philosophy in the technologized sciences’? For Heidegger, this end of philosophy as 
the activity of questioning signals the triumph of planetary technicity, and because technicity 
emerges from western metaphysics, ‘the end of philosophy means the beginning of the world 
civilization that is based upon Western European thinking.’5 But if this triumph has not yet been as 
total as Heidegger imagined, then perhaps we can accept Heidegger’s insight that planetary technicity 
represents the culmination and collapse of western metaphysics without accepting that only a god 
can save us. Perhaps, that is, there is a saving power in the thought of those who have somehow 
                                                     
4 Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture” in Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (ed and 
trans) Off the Beaten Track (Cambridge University Press 2002) 71.  
5 Martin Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” in David Farrell Krell (ed 
and trans) Basic Writings (HarperCollins 2008) 435. 
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resisted the ‘planetary imperialism of technically organized man’? Perhaps, as Oscar Guardiola-
Rivera has recently put it, ‘only Indians can save our modern soul’?6 If the crisis of technicity is 
caused by the forgetting of Being in western metaphysics, then the ongoing “ontological turn” in 
anthropology that is returning to the question of Being as it is posed in indigenous thought might 
offer us an alternative future to that of the global domination of technical-scientific rationality—
perhaps even a future at all.  
But because technicity is the (western) understanding of Being in the modern age, it is not 
something that we can simply will ourselves out of through engagement with or appropriation of 
indigenous thought. Indeed, Heidegger himself had made this point when asked in the 1966 
interview about a turn to “Eastern” thought as a way out of the enframing of planetary technicity:  
My conviction is that only the same place where the modern technical world took its origin 
can we also prepare an overturning [Umkehr] of it. In other words, this cannot happen by 
taking over Zen Buddhism or other Eastern experiences of the world. For this overturning 
of thought we need the help of the European tradition and a new appropriation of it. 
Thought will be transformed only through thought that has the same origin and 
determination.7  
 
Given Heidegger’s dubious illusions of the purity of European, especially German, thought he no 
doubt overstates his case here. For as numerous decolonial theorists have pointed out, so-called 
western philosophy has always been produced in a process of “creolization” with the thought of its 
outside, meaning that there is no purely “European tradition.”8 This is not to say, however, that an 
“overturning” and “reappropriation” of western thought itself is not necessary: as Brazilian 
anthropologist Eduardo Vivieros de Castro has put it, we have a lot of ontological work to do in 
                                                     
6 Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, “On the Shaman’s Couch: Only Indians Can Save Our Modern Soul” 
Kindle Magazine 3 April 2014 <http://kindlemag.in/shamans-couch-indians-save-modern-soul/>  
7 As above note 2 at 61.  
8 See for example Enrique Dussel, “Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism” (trans Javier Krauel and 
Virgnia Tuma) (2000) 1(3) Nepantla: Views from the South 465-78; and Françoise Lionnet and Shu-mei 
Shih (eds) The Creolization of Theory (Duke University Press 2011). 
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order to make “even disagreement with an animist warrior possible.”9 One such reappropriation is 
the theory of creolization and the decolonial rereading of the history of modern philosophy in terms 
of the concept of “coloniality.” To be sure, before a real engagement—that is to say, a non-
appropriative relation capable of sharing in difference—with indigenous thinking is possible, it is 
necessary to decolonize the Eurocentric presuppositions of ontology. In this essay, however, I argue 
that no such decolonial project is possible without also thinking the question of sexuate difference. 
In this, I follow Luce Irigaray, who has amply demonstrated that western metaphysics—the 
metaphysics that gives rise to coloniality and planetary technicity—originates in an oblivion of 
sexuate difference. This oblivion, according to Irigaray, dissociates us from living nature and thus 
must be attended to before we would be capable of cultivating life, approaching nature, or engaging 
with another intellectual heritage as anything other than a reserve of resources. Although her work 
remains controversial in precisely this respect, this is precisely why Irigaray has suggested—in 
reference to Heidegger’s invocation of the saving power of a god—that it is sexuate difference that 
‘could bring us “salvation” [nous apporterait le «salut»]’ if we thought it through.10 Sexuate difference 
has such a saving power because, for Irigaray, it offers a ‘different articulation of the speaking animal 
with nature, with matter, and with the body,” all of which have been suppressed within the history 
of western metaphysics, and especially so in the age of modern techno-science.11 If our only hope 
for overcoming planetary technicity, which now implicates the very future of life itself, lies, as 
Heidegger suggested, in questioning what has been concealed in the unfolding of our epoch, then, as 
Irigaray has notoriously argued, sexuate difference is indeed “the question of our epoch.”       
                                                     
9 Eduardo Vivieros de Castro, “Exchanging Perspectives: The Transformation of Objects into 
Subjects in Amerindian Ontologies” (2004) 10(3) Common Knowledge 484. 
10 Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexuate difference (trans Gillian Gill and Carolyn Burke) (Athelone Press 
1993) 5. 
11 Luce Irigaray, To Speak is Never Neutral (trans Gail Schwab) (Routledge 2002) 229. 
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 Three saving powers: a god, Indians, sexuate difference. How to chart a path between them? 
By way of setting out on such a journey, this essay has four sections. In the first, I outline 
Heidegger’s account of planetary technicity as the ontology of the modern age, as well as how this 
relates to what both indigenous activists and Irigaray have understood as a “global death project.” In 
the second, I draw on decolonial theory to situate planetary technicity within the history of the 
“coloniality of Being,” examining the decolonial politics of rethinking ontology. The third section is 
an exposition of Irigaray’s highly original critique of western metaphysics as technophallogocentrism 
which shows how the death project of technicity originates in the oblivion of sexuate difference and 
the maternal debt, leading to a autological cosmos framed by the horizon of death and Non-Being 
rather than relation-in-difference to the other. Here, I defend the inextricability of sexuate difference 
and decoloniality to any rethinking of ontology capable of confronting planetary technicity. Finally, I 
conclude by bringing these threads together with the case of the Kogi people of Colombia who have 
made two documentary films in order to warn the developed world that we will not be able to stop 
planetary destruction until we re-member the Mother that has been destroyed by technical 
imperialism. Because the Kogi understanding of Being is entirely structured by sexuate difference 
and is also an indigenous mode of resistance to the global death project of planetary technicity—one 
that they seek, at least in part, to share with us—I argue that it allows us to see how the passage 
from God to the Indians can only take place through sexuate difference. It is only such a passage, I 
argue, that would permit us to enter into a new constellation of Being, to borrow one of Heidegger’s 
favorite phrases, one that, perhaps, would offer us a chance for life.  
 
2. Planetary Technicity and the Global Death Project 
Modern technicity, for Heidegger, is identified not with any particular technological modalities or 
objects but rather by a general ontological comportment in which everything is positioned as 
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inventory in a “standing reserve” that is constantly available for human appropriation and 
manipulation.12 Heidegger refers to this comportment as “positionality” (das Ge-Stell) in which Being 
becomes nothing but a process of ordering the pieces of the standing reserve and thinking takes the 
form of an instrumental and calculative rationality driven by efficacy and accumulation. While the 
origin of technicity can be located in the tekhne of ancient Greece, which named the revealing of 
Being by human know-how rather than by “nature” (physis), with the reformulation of nature as a 
universal and uniform realm of objectivity within the modern mathematical sciences, modern 
technicity turns all Being into objects for and of the human subject.13 Within the modern epoch, then, 
technicity is not merely one mode of revealing among others, nor is it the “application” of scientific 
knowledge; it is the very meaning of Being as such, the a priori condition of all experience, and the 
fundamental relation to Being necessary for any particular scientific or technological development. If 
within the Ge-Stell of technicity, all Being is understood as always already standing by (at least as 
“matter” and “energy”) and there is nothing more to be revealed, then humanity is compelled to 
develop ever-more efficient, precise, and expansive ways of ordering it (hence the insatiable drive 
that animates technical and scientific “progress”). This is why Heidegger describes positionality the 
“plundering drive that orders the constant orderability of the complete standing reserve.”14 Space 
exploration, quantum mechanics, the atomic bomb, industrial capitalism, etc. are therefore the 
almost inevitable outcomes of planetary technicity—that is, of the reduction of everything that is to 
essentially exchangeable resources in a literally universal reserve. Technicity, then, does not 
“intervene” in nature, in sociopolitical formations, or in life as if from the outside; rather, it names 
                                                     
12 See Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology” in David Farrell Krell (ed and 
trans) Basic Writings (HarperCollins 2008) 311-41. 
13 See Martin Heidegger, “Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics” in David Farrell Krell 
(ed and trans) Basic Writings (HarperCollins 2008) 271-305.  
14 Martin Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures (trans Andrew J Mitchell) (Indiana University Press 
2012) 31. The 1949 Bremen lectures are the material from which the technics essay is derived.   
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the Being-technical of the world itself, what Jean-Luc Nancy calls “the ecotechnology that our ecologies 
and economies have already become.”15   
 Planetary technicity is thus the ontology of the so-called modern globalized world. The 
positioning of the universe as standing reserve both makes possible the relentless pursuit of 
accumulation that drives global capitalism and makes necessary the management and administration 
of these resources on a global scale. From this perspective, seemingly opposed projects such as the 
ruthless plunder of the global South by multinational conglomerates and development programs that 
seek to “modernize” these nations, are underwritten by the same onto-logic, the same logic of Being. 
Regardless of their “own” subjective motivations, humans are themselves conscripted into planetary 
technicity, which seeks only its own totality. Everything (including humans) becomes the ends and 
means of everything else as the world becomes nothing but a complex interconnection or “network” 
of diverse techniques and technologies. From the ever more horrific technics for manufacturing 
death and debility in wars and occupations to the ever more remarkable technics for manufacturing 
life and health, from the coal production of China to the green geoengineering of Scandinavia, the 
planet is nothing but an assemblage of technical possibilities and goals that are ontologically 
equivalent. In this onto-logic of general equivalence, meaning (i.e., qualitative difference) is produced 
only through the accumulation of large quantities that must, moreover, be ever-greater in order to 
even register as value. “Wealth, health, productivity, knowledge, authority, imagination,” as Nancy 
writes, are “all enlisted into the same logic whose general principle seems to be the conversion of 
quantity into quality. Large numbers lay down the law, whether they be of money, population, speed, 
power, circulation, information, and so on. In any case, and in the interconnection of all these 
registers, ‘quality,’ that is, ‘value’ or ‘meaning’ is dispersed in the interactive correlation of all large 
                                                     
15 Jean-Luc Nancy and Aurélien Barrau, What’s These Worlds Coming To? (trans Travis Holloway and 
Flor Méchain) (Fordham University Press 2015) 54. 
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numbers.”16 Because nothing has any value in itself, technicity is fundamentally nihilistic: even life 
and death are significant only to the extent that they contribute to some quantitative aggregate large 
enough to stand out against the backdrop of general equivalence.  
Nevertheless, it is precisely the onto-logic of planetary technicity that many indigenous 
activist groups in Latin America have identified explicitly as “the death project” of globalization. This 
onto-logic, as la Asociación de Cabildos Indigénas del Norte del Cauca (ACÍN) puts it, is based on a 
principle of identity in which accumulation is equivalent to Being. Although they do not do so in the 
language of Heidegger, and although Heidegger makes very little reference to capitalism or 
colonialism, they point out that the onto-logic of planetary technicity underwrites both capitalism 
and imperialism: ‘This logic is based in the following:…everything that exists has value only to the 
extent that it…serves accumulation. This is a logic that leads to the persecution of the people in the 
territory, the existence of the paramilitaries, the legislation of dispossession, etc. These are only the 
local and national expressions of the global death project that is transforming life into junk with an 
intermediate step that is the commodity and the market.”17 This transformation of life into “junk” is 
what Nancy has called the process of “denaturation” that defines planetary technicity. For Nancy, 
from its origin in ancient Greece, technicity is a progressive process of converting everything that is 
into a product of tekhne, that is, of stripping it of any natural ends or principles so that technics can 
relate only with themselves. Technicity is the end and the means, the only principle in itself: it is only 
within this process of denaturation that objects pass through the market to generate capital and that 
                                                     
16 Jean-Luc Nancy, After Fukushima: The Equivalence of Catastrophes (trans Charlotte Mandell) 
(Fordham University Press 2015) 34. 
17 ACÍN, “Tejido de Comunicacíon y Relaciones Externas de la Verdad y la Vida de la Asociacíon de 
Cabildos Indigénas del Norte del Cauca” 
<http://videocomunidad.univalle.edu.co/descargas/Tejido_de_comunicacion.pdf>. Translation 
mine. The phrase “death project [el proyecto de muerte]” appears to have first been used by the Ejército 
Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, to whom the ACÍN makes explicit reference.  
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peoples are dispossessed. On this basis, Nancy argues for the “necessity of determining the history 
of technics up to our time without giving it another meaning in its fundamental contingency than 
the indefinite relation of technicity with itself and to the escape of its denaturation. One would have 
to examine, in this respect, the succession of technics…of wealth as such, of production itself 
(capital, labor), of society (democracy) and finally, of nature itself, or of its complete denaturation, 
whether by mutation or by total destruction (biological, ecological, ethological engineering).”18 
Planetary technicity, then, is both “biopolitical” and “necropolitical” as it works to denature life and 
death by converting them into objects of technical-scientific representation, production, 
management, and administration.19 Even in contexts where life is fostered for certain populations—
an ever-smaller number of populations, of course—this is part of a general process of bringing all 
lives under the control of economic and political technics within the “global death project” of 
making waste out of nature: these “lives” are nothing more than inventory in the standing reserve.  
For Irigaray, the global death project is explicitly tied to sexuate difference insofar as it is an 
expression of sexuate, i.e. masculine, Being. In an address given to a group of women after the 
Chernobyl disaster in 1986, she made this point very clearly:  
The death machines are traded around with vast capital expenditures in order to keep the 
peace, or so we are told….It doesn’t have to go this way. It is sexuate. But the technical 
epoch has given the weapons of war a power that far surpasses the conflicts and risks 
between patriarchs. Women, children, all that lives, even elementary matter find themselves 
conscripted bodies and all [s’y trouve embarqué corps et biens]. And this death and destruction 
cannot be reduced only to war:…technical developments put us to such corporeal tests that 
we are threatened with physical and psychical annihilation….With the objective purpose of 
accumulating material goods, and the subjective goal of bolstering the masculine subjective 
economy, science allows disorder and pollution to increase and then funds various kinds of 
                                                     
18 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World, or Globalization (trans François Raffoul and David 
Pettigrew) (The State University of New York Press 2007) 89.  
19 Indeed, the concept of technique is central to both Foucault’s analysis of biopower and Mbembe’s 
analysis of necropolitics. See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I (trans Robert Hurley) 
(Vintage Books 1990) and Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics” (trans Libby Mientjes) (2003) 15(1) 
Public Culture 11-40. A discussion of the relationship between these two rubrics is beyond the scope 
of the present essay.  
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curative medicine….Various pro-birth politics [politiques natalistes] for economic or religious 
reasons do not prevent the fact that giving life appears as compulsory as destroying it.20 
 
Irigaray’s point is not (or not only) that the death project is the product of an arbitrary historical 
exclusion and subordination of women that enables men to control technology on a planetary scale, 
but rather that the relationship between technicity and masculinity is ontological, that is, that technicity 
is, in its essence, a “phallomorphic” determination of Being.21 Like Nancy, Irigaray partially follows 
Heidegger in understanding technicity as a progressive process of denaturation that uproots beings 
in order to master them techno-logically. For her, more significantly, this process “testifies to an 
oblivion of life, a failure to recognize the debt owed to the mother, to maternal genealogy, to those 
who carry out the work of producing and sustaining life.”22 Western metaphysics is therefore a death 
project from the start because it begins with the ontological annihilation of birth and the living 
sexuate body; it is only on the basis of this ontological annihilation of life—this Being-toward-death—
that the global death project of technicity, and that European Man’s technical domination of the rest 
of the planet, can proceed. This will become clearer as I elaborate Irigaray’s reading of western 
metaphysics as technophallogocentrism below; however, for now, suffice it to say that Irigaray 
understands the project of technicity as a sexuate project that is grounded in a desexuation and 
devitalization of the cosmos, which conflates a phallocentric understanding of Being with Being “as 
such.” Although this argument has, somewhat oddly, been subjected to an enormous amount of 
criticism in Anglophone feminist theory, it resonates deeply with the indigenous mobilization against 
the death project. Julia Suárez Krabbe, for instance, writes of how the indigenous peoples of 
                                                     
20 Luce Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies (trans Gillian Gill) (Columbia University Press) 186-7. 
21 I am indebted to conversations with Monica Obreja for clarifying this point, which was the subject 
of her dissertation Technology and Sexuate difference (PhD Thesis, Linköping University 2012).   
22 As above note 19. 
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Colombia’s Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (including the Kogi) directly tie the planetary effects of the 
death project to our (i.e., “western”) forgetting of the Mother: 
Simplistically put, human rights violations, climate change, illness, wars, earthquakes, and so 
on happen…because of the world’s disequilibrium. This imbalance affects all spheres of life, 
from the micro and intimate, to the macro structural and macrocosmic. It stems from a lack 
of reciprocity—more exactly, from some human beings’ unwillingness or inability to 
recompense the Mother for what She has given and to attend to Her teachings. This inability 
to work with the Mother is part of that which continues to give force to the death project.23 
 
From Irigaray’s perspective, then, the central question will be: if the death project is a result of a 
desexuation of the cosmos that grounds western metaphysics on a constitutive matricide, what work 
woul be necessary in order for us to be able to work with and recompense the Mother? 
  
3. Coloniality and the Question of Being 
Heidegger was unequivocal in understanding planetary technicity as a form of western imperialism, 
calling it the ‘complete Europeanization of the earth and of man.’24 For him, the essence of this 
process is not the global circulation of Euro-American technologies or even the mobilization of 
technics as instruments of imperial domination, but rather the conscription of the entire planet into 
the same determination of Being as a standing reserve that is constantly present-at-hand:  
Now that modern technicity has arranged its expansion and rule over the whole earth, it is 
not just the sputniks and their by-products that are circling around our planet; it is rather 
Being-as-presence in the sense of calculable material that claims all the inhabitants of earth in 
a uniform manner without the inhabitants of the non-European continents explicitly 
knowing this or even being able or wanting to know of the origin of this determination of 
Being. (Evidently those who desire such a knowledge least of all are those busy developers 
who today are pushing the so-called underdeveloped countries into the realm of hearing 
where the claim of Being speaks from the innermost core of modern technicity.)25 
 
                                                     
23 Julia Suárez-Krabbe, Race, Rights, and Rebels: Alternatives to Human Rights and Development from the 
Global South (Rowman & Littlefield 2016) 5. Emphasis modified.  
24 Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language (trans Peter Hertz) (Harper & Row 1971) 15.  
25 Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being (trans Joan Stambaugh) (Harper & Row 1972) 7. 
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The merit of Heidegger’s analysis of planetary technicity is that it allows us to understand the 
fundamental ontology of global capitalism and globalization that underlies their particular localizations. 
Nevertheless, his is a Eurocentric analysis of the unfolding of technicity as the ontology of 
European “modernity,” even if it is highly critical of this project as a “conquest” of all other 
ontologies. But as Walter Mignolo argues, “modernity” is a European narrative that can also be 
narrated from its underside: coloniality.26 As such, planetary technicity is the ontology of coloniality 
as well as modernity: to study it from this vantage leads both to a richer analysis of its operations 
and modalities as well as to a different horizon of possibilities for overcoming it. The fact that 
Heidegger did not consider technicity from the perspective of coloniality is certainly one of the 
reasons that he grew increasingly despairing about moving beyond it.  
 The concept of coloniality refers above all to the matrix of power established in the Spanish 
conquest of the Americas, which inaugurated a new world system.27 According to decolonial 
theorists such as Quijano and Mignolo, it was on the basis of the new forms of power relations 
developed in the colonial conquest that the major epistemological and economic reformulations 
                                                     
26 “‘Modernity’ is a complex narrative whose point of origination was Europe; a narrative that builds 
Western civilization by celebrating its achievements while at the same time hiding its darker side 
‘coloniality.’ Coloniality, in other words, is constitutive of modernity—there is no modernity without 
coloniality.” Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options 
(Duke University Press 2011) 2-3. 
27 The concept of the “coloniality of power” was first theorized by Aníbal Quijano and has been 
developed over the course of a now-voluminous body of scholarship. See Quijano, “Coloniality of 
Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America” (trans Michael Ennis) (2000) 1(3) Nepantla: Views from the 
South 533-80. Eurocentric accounts of modernity typically begin with the Reformation (1517), the 
Peace of Westphalia (1648), and/or the French Revolution (1789), situating colonization as an 
incidental, even if major, component of this history. Theorists of coloniality, on the contrary, situate 
the beginning of modernity in a series of events that transpired in Spain in 1492 (its “annus 
mirabilis”): the fall of Granada that ended nearly 800 years of Islamic presence on the Iberian 
peninsula, the Alhambra Decree that expelled all Jews who did not convert to Catholicism, the 
publication of the first grammar of a modern language (Gramática de la lengua castellana by Antonio de 
Nebrija), and the arrival of Columbus at Guanahani that soon lead to the displacement of the 
Mediterranean by the Atlantic trade route (see, for example, Dussel above note 8).  
 14 
constitutive of “modernity” took place: namely, Reason (which decolonial theorists call “epistemic 
coloniality”), the state (or “political coloniality”), and capitalism (or “economic coloniality”). 
Coloniality thus consists of a colonization of space, time, knowledge, exchange, social relations, and 
so on that subsists and persists beyond any localized colonial contexts and continues to shape the 
contemporary forms of settler colonization and neo-colonization (or “globalization”) today. In an 
incisive engagement with Heidegger, Nelson Maldonado-Torres adds that coloniality also consists of 
a colonization of Being itself and argues that by neglecting this, Heidegger’s return to the question 
of Being remains complicit in perpetuating it. I strongly agree with this argument; however, I think 
that the coloniality of Being should be linked more explicitly to Heidegger’s thinking of technicity as 
the ontology of modernity (Maldonado-Torres does not refer to this aspect of Heidegger’ work).28 In 
his Eurocentric analysis, Heidegger locates the origin of technicity in the formulation of the 
mathematical theory of nature in the modern physical sciences, first in Galileo’s experiments with 
free fall (1604-38) and culminating in Newton’s Principia (1687).29 While in the Aristotelian 
cosmology that held sway through the Scholastics, “nature” was thought as a kind of principle of 
movement internal to bodies that makes them what they are, the mathematical theory reconceives 
Nature as a uniform space-time context of locomotion of essentially identical bodies. For Heidegger, 
mathematical science projects onto nature in advance a set of axioms by which it determines what its 
objects are and how they are to be quantified, measured, and observed. Descartes, in Heidegger’s 
reading, is therefore not at all an “epistemologist,” but rather a metaphysician who rethinks Being in 
accordance with the mathematical sciences’ reformulation of beings as objects: with Descartes, the 
                                                     
28 Nelson Maldonado-Torres, “On the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a 
Concept” (2007) 21(2-3) Cultural Studies 240-70.  
29 See Heidegger at note 12, or the (out of print) full lecture series from which this excerpt is taken 
What is a Thing? (trans WB Barton and Vera Deutsch) (University Press of America 1967). Galileo’s 
experiments took place as early as 1604 although published in his Discorsi in 1638.  
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“I” becomes the modern determination of the Being of beings, that is, the metaphysical ground or 
sub-jectum of beings, which become ob-jects that stand against the subject. In this, the principle and 
origin (the arkhe) of beings is no longer, as it was in the Aristotlean cosmos, nature (or phusis) but 
rather the knowledge of the human (tekhne). This technical reinvention of nature as a realm of 
objectivity is thus, for Heidegger, the first step in the accumulation of all that is in the standing 
reserve, which is why he famously calls modern physics the “herald of positionality.”30   
 Heidegger’s Eurocentric reading of modernity leads him to act as if this reinvention of 
nature emerges almost ex nihilo—indeed he says that the “provenance” of modern science is “still 
unknown.”31 Examining it from the underside of modernity, however, enables a much fuller picture. 
As Quijano points out, the paradigm of a subject that is for-itself and in-itself and an external object 
that is for-the-subject, and the paradigm of “nature” as composed of such objects—that is to say, 
the paradigm of European rationality—“could only have been the product of a relation of 
coloniality between Europe and the rest of the world.”32 The patterns constitutive of this paradigm 
can be traced to the early European involvement in the Atlantic, especially the Spanish conquest of 
the Canary Islands (1402-1496) and the beginning of the Portuguese trade in African slaves (1441). 
In response to these events, a series of papal bulls were issued between 1452 and 1493 that 
conferred upon Portugal and Spain the “right of conquest” of all unknown lands, legitimizing the 
expropriation of territory, the seizure of all goods and resources, and the enslavement all non-
Christian peoples “in perpetuity.”33 Such a move marked a fundamental difference from earlier 
                                                     
30 Heidegger as above note 11 at 327. 
31 As above. 
32 Aníbal Quijano, “Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality” (trans Sonia Therborn) (2007) 21(2-3) 
174. 
33 The most significant of these are the “Dum diversas” (1452) and the “Romanus pontifex” (1454) 
issued by Pope Nicholas V, and the “Inter Caetera” (1493) issued by Pope Alexander VI, which 
extended the first two into the “New World” after the first voyage of Columbus.  
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forms of colonization and slavery: it laid down, as an axiomatic law, a basic blueprint according to 
which land not even yet known was projected as terra nullis and all things (including human beings) 
not even yet encountered were represented as uniform objects that could be encountered in the 
same way no matter the specific context. Thus, when the explorers reached “new” lands in Africa 
and the Americas, they no longer encountered specific places constituted by things of essentially 
different natures, but rather a ubiquitous “State of Nature” as essentially empty space within which 
objects without any essential differences could be ordered by the subject in a nearly infinite number of 
possible arrangements. This establishment of coloniality is thus an axiomatic primitive accumulation that 
ensures that “nature belongs in advance to the standing reserve of the orderable within 
positionality.”34 In this sense, it is coloniality that is the supposedly unknown provenance of modern 
science, that which first secured “nature” for techno-scientific ordering in the Ge-Stell.35 The fact 
that, in this new understanding of the world, conquest is a taking possession of what already 
properly “belongs” to the conqueror, is a direct predecessor to the formation of the modern 
mathematical sciences (and philosophy) in which thinking is an apprehension or representation of 
what already belongs to the subject. The two faces of the European “Age of Discovery”—
geographic exploration and scientific revolution—essentially belong together as a taking-possession or 
                                                     
34 Heidegger above note 13 at 39. 
35 This point is attested to by direct historical connections: the Portuguese and Spanish expeditions 
(especially Columbus’s 1492 arrival in the Americas) empirically disproved the reigning Christian-
Ptolemaic geography, which posited that the habitable land of Earth was miraculously floating at the 
center of the sphere of water. The publication of the first map of this “New World,” Martin 
Waldseemüller’s Universalis Cosmographia (1507), led Copernicus to realize that if the Christian-
Ptolemaic geography is incorrect, then the cosmology of concentric spheres orbiting around the 
Earth, must also be incorrect. It was Copernicus’s revolutionary break with the principle of non-
homogeneity of substance between the terrestrial and celestial realms that enabled the 
reconceptualization of nature as composed of a homogenous physical substance in Galileo and 
Newton. The fundamental principle of mathematical science, Galileo’s and Newton’s “all bodies are 
measureable,” is therefore a direct translation of Columbus’s “all seas are navigable.” See Sylvia 
Wynter, “1492: A New World View” in Vera Lawrence Hyatt and Rex Nettleford (eds) Race, 
Discourse, and the Origin of the Americas: A New World View (Smithsonian Institution Press) 5-57. 
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accumulation of a world that already lies before the subject: if what is called “discovery” is what 
Heidegger refers to as the “greed of representational calculation” characteristic of modern technicity 
then there is no way to rigorously separate the scientist’s approach to nature from the colonizer’s.36 
The conquistadors, then, pioneered the first form of modern subjectivity: an individual, self-making 
agent placed before an external world of calculable objects and whose powers of representation and 
ordering alone determine all that is. And it is this repositioning of Man’s place in the world that will 
lead to the modern reconceptualization of thinking and of freedom as a going-forth from out of the 
self, a laying hold or grasping.37 In other words, the technical-colonial subject—what Dussel calls the ego 
conquiro (inseparably combined with the Renaissance humanists’ reinterpretation of Man as homo 
faber)—enables and subtends the other forms of modern subjectivity: rational, political, economic.38 
 To place Heidegger’s analysis of technicity as the ontology of modernity within the more 
expansive historicization of modernity offered by theorists of coloniality is to recognize technicity 
and coloniality as essential to one another. In this sense, planetary technicity can be understood both 
as the coloniality of Being (i.e., the ways in which Being is structured by the colonial matrix of power) 
                                                     
36 Heidegger above note 13 at 24. 
37 See Heidegger above note 4 at 81-4.   
38 Dussel above note 8. The founding figures of the studia humanitatis articulated the first “secular” 
model of the human—“Man”—through their “rediscovery” of pre-Christian Greco-Roman 
philosophy that allowed them to break entirely with the reigning theology of Medieval Scholasticism, 
which placed the human at a fixed position in the Great Chain of Being such that the only worthy 
knowledge was study of the ecclesiastical texts. In this reinterpretation of the human, Man is the 
maker of himself, thus individual discovery and knowledge are of the utmost importance. In this, 
there was a reciprocal influence between the humanists and the early explorers (such as Columbus 
and Prince Henry “the Navigator”). Consider, for instance, how Pico della Mirandola reinterprets 
the “fall” of Adam in his Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486), which has been called the “manifesto” 
of the Renaissance: “Adam we give you no fixed place to live, no form that is peculiar to you… 
According to your desires and judgments, you will have and possess whatever place to live, whatever 
form, and whatever functions you yourself choose….You with no limit or no bound may choose for 
yourself the limits and bounds of your nature…you may fashion yourself into whatever form you 
choose.” It was Pope Nicholas V, the author of the papal bulls bestowing the “right of conquest,” 
who encouraged the development of the humanities, which earlier popes had seen as heresy. 
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and as the Being of coloniality (i.e., as the determination of Being that underwrites coloniality). As such, 
the Heideggerian ontological difference between Being and beings must be thought alongside what 
Maldonado-Torres calls “colonial difference” (or “sub-ontological” difference).39 As Heidegger 
shows, the objectification of all beings (human and non) in technicity takes place on the prior 
oblivion of Being that characterizes the history of western metaphysics: it is the nihilation of Being 
that first reduces Being to the sum of present-at-hand beings and then this to a standing-reserve of 
objects. But because western philosophy had, since Parmenides, thought Being in terms of a 
monotheistic onto-theology of the One, Being could only be thought vis-à-vis Non-Being or Nothing. 
Thus, even after Being had been reduced to a standing reserve of objects, even after Man had killed 
God, the western ontology remained a “monotheistic” thinking in which what is outside of Man’s 
world-picture (i.e., the sum total of representational ordering) does not exist. In order to bring 
everything into this world-picture, then, the process of colonization consisted of a double 
movement in which all beings encountered by the technical-colonial subject were stripped of any 
ontological status (i.e., their Being was nihilated) while they were also objectified as beings.40 Contrary 
to standard accounts, then, when colonized peoples encountered the European colonizers, they 
faced something far more formidable than technology and weaponry that was simply more 
sophisticated than their own: they were up against the first understanding of the world without 
Being, the technical world in which all that is already belongs to Man as the object of his 
manipulation. This annihilation of Being, however, nevertheless remains a determination of Being 
and thus planetary technicity is an ontology without Being, like a monotheistic world without God. 
                                                     
39 As above note 27. 
40 The first process is what Frantz Fanon means when he describes the colonized as being trapped 
within a “zone of non-Being,” while the second is captured in Aimé Césaire’s famous equation 
“colonization=thingification.” See Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks (trans Richard Philcox) (Grove 
Press 2008) xii and Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism (trans Joan Pinkham) (Monthly Review Press 
2000) 42. 
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The project of colonization, then, had to actively destroy indigenous ontologies—which were not 
(and are not) viewed by the technical-scientific-colonial subject as different constellations of Being (since 
Being had already been nihilated) but rather as false views of the singular cosmos of Man (which is all 
that exists)—in order to impose the ontology of technicity on the planet. The reason why planetary 
technicity holds such a hegemonic grip is precisely because, in annihilating Being as such, it has 
enabled the conflation of the technical-scientific world-picture of Man with Being itself. This is 
precisely what has been challenged by the recent “ontological turn” in anthropology, which seeks to 
move beyond the ethnographic study of different “world-views” (which presumes the singular world 
of Man) to the study of different conceptual worlds. Understanding indigenous thought as ontology 
challenges the coloniality of Being of planetary technicity, or what Viveiros de Castro refers to as the 
western “absolute ontological monarchy” that “derealizes” all non-Euro-American thought, for in 
this gesture Being must no longer be thought in opposition to Non-Being but rather in relation to 
Being-as-other.41 In this way, Viveiros de Castro calls ontological anthropology “a practice of the 
permanent decolonization of thought,” which is why what Heidegger called the “question of Being” 
is the most political question of all.42 
                                                     
41 Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, The Relative Native: Essays on Indigenous Conceptual Worlds (Hau Books 
2015) 54. Viveiros de Castro is aware that making an “ontological” approach foundational risks 
making the European thinking of Being axiomatic, but argues that it is at the very least “tactically” 
necessary: “The image of Being is obviously dangerous analogic ground when it comes to 
anthropological re-imaginings of non-western conceptual imaginations, and the notion of ontology 
is not without its own risks….Nevertheless, I think the language of ontology is important for one 
specific and, let’s say, tactical reason. It acts as a counter-measure to a derealizing trick frequently 
played against the native’s thinking, which turns this thought into a kind of sustained phantasy, by 
reducing it to the dimensions of a form of knowledge or representation, that is, to an ‘epistemology’ 
or a ‘worldview.’ As if whatever there is to know or view was already decided beforehand—and 
decided, of course, in favour of our ontology. So the notion of ontology isn’t evoked here to suggest 
that all thought, be it Greek, Melanesian, African, or Amazonian, expresses a metaphysics of Being, 
but to underline the fact that all thought is inseparable from the reality which corresponds to its 
exterior” 
42 Viveiros de Castro as above at 75. 
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4. Luce Irigaray and the Matricidal Meta/physics of Technophallogocentrism 
Throughout his work, Heidegger was preoccupied with the question of the relationship between the 
history of western metaphysics and the rise of planetary technicity: how exactly did the oblivion of 
Being in ancient Greece give way to the positioning of all that is in the standing reserve of modern 
technology and science? As is well known, Heidegger locates the origin of western metaphysics in a 
series of reductions of the ancient Greek thinking of physis, which originally named the general 
process of emergence and abiding, or Being as such. When the first philosophers sought to 
understand to understand Being itself without recourse to what we would now call the supernatural 
(as in mythological thinking), they did so by way of “physical beings” (ta physei onta), thereby opening 
the door for the meta-physical approach to the question of Being by way of beings.43 Once Being is 
understood in terms of beings, however, the thinking of Being (phusis) as a process of emergence and 
abidance is forgotten in favor of present beings and tekhne (the know-how of humans) will gradually 
replace physis as the origin and principle (arkhe) of all that is. In the age of planetary technicity, 
Heidegger argues that a return to the pre-Socratic “first beginning” of metaphysics is necessary in 
order to recover something of this forgotten thinking of physis. In her extended engagement with 
Heidegger, Irigaray partly follows his return to the pre-Socratics, but she argues that what was 
forgotten at the beginning of metaphysics was not Being, but living and, therefore, sexuate difference. In 
her book on Heidegger, L’oubli de l’air chez Martin Heidegger (1983), Irigaray points out that with the 
thinkers to whom Heidegger returns (Parmenides and Heraclitus), physis is already gathered by the 
logos, cut off from its material generativity (genesis), which has been given over to the language of 
Man. In other words, it is already here that the foundational tautology of western metaphysics in 
                                                     
43 See Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics (trans Gregory Fried and Richard Polt) (Yale University 
Press 2000). 
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which Being (physis) is “the same” as thinking (logos) is in play for “the elementality of physis—air, 
water, earth, fire—is always already nihilated by [Man’s] own element: his language.”44 Moreover if, 
as according to Heidegger, it is this thinking of physis in Parmenides and Heraclitus that constitutes 
the first thinking of Being as such and, for both of them, Being is conceptualized as eternal, solitary, 
and without generation, then Being “itself”—from the very beginning—is constituted precisely as a 
meta-physical oblivion of physis. By detaching physis from its material element and substituting the 
logos as the matrix of the cosmos, physis no longer holds sway as the self-generating source of bringing-
forth that coexists with tekhne. Rather, Being is equated with what has been gathered by the logos and 
thus tekhne, the know-how of man, becomes the arkhe of all, positioning and ordering nature long 
before the rise of modern science and technology. As Irigaray writes: 
Tekhne is now the arkhe of the whole: the framing of the world is tekhne and it forgets the 
origin that is nature. Physis is always already subjected to technology and science: that is, to 
the technology and science of the logos. In these, something of the manner in which physical 
beings grow is lost. Things, cut from their natural enrootedness, float about, wandering the 
propositional landscape. The phuein of physical beings is forgetten in the physis of the logos. 
The physical constitution of beings is forgotten in the metaphysics of Being. Nature is re-
created by the logos.45  
 
The logos therefore constitutes what Irigaray calls the “architechne,” the originary technics by which 
Man usurps the generative power of physis for his own refashioning of the world. And this therefore 
means that the materiality of physis, especially the insensible air, is always already enframed as a standing 
reserve by and for the technical positionality (Ge-stell) of the logos. For Irigaray, then, what metaphysics 
“forgot” in the enframing of physis was not, as Heidegger would have it, Being, but rather vital 
materiality as a living process. The “oblivion of Being” so extensively analyzed by Heidegger thus 
covers over an even prior oblivion. And the fact that this living materiality was already forgotten by 
                                                     
44 Luce Irigaray, The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger (trans Mary Beth Mader) (University of Texas 
Press 1999) 74. 
45 Above at 86. 
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the first thinkers of Being explains why, when Heidegger looks to their works to recover a thinking 
of Being after its metaphysical oblivion, it takes the form of a Being-toward-death: the Being that he 
is looking for has always already been constituted in opposition to living. For Irigaray, Heidegger’s 
“hostility” to science and technology, and his notorious difficulty in grappling with the relation 
between life and Being, are therefore indicative of his desire to preserve the logos as the exclusive site 
of the revealing of Being: for her, the House of Language is the very architectonics of metaphysics. 
In her reading of the history of metaphysics, Irigaray directly connects this forgetting of the 
vital materiality of phusis to a forgetting of sexuate difference. This occurs first through the forgetting 
of birth and the role of the maternal-feminine. In the pre-philosophical cosmogonies, the general 
process(es) of emergence and transformation (phusis and genesis) are thought explicitly in terms of 
birth, as evinced by the respective roots of these words (phuein and gignomai), which mean “to beget” 
and “to be born.” With Heraclitus and Parmenides, however, phusis-as-Being is understood precisely 
as “that which has no birth” (ageneton, Parmenides) or “that which always ways” (aei esti, Heraclitus). 
In this, the generative materiality of what Irigaray calls both “mother-nature [mère-nature]” and 
“mother-matter [mère-matière]” has always already been appropriated, for it is no longer nature, matter 
or the mother that are the source (arkhe) of being(s), but rather the logos. In other words, for these 
thinkers, it is only within the logos that Being and beings emerge and abide. For Irigaray, this amounts 
to the uprooting and gathering of beings in the logos of Being, an airless space that exists parallel to 
the “natural” world in which there is no birth, growth, or change except through their mimesis in the 
form of thinking and saying. But, Irigaray queries, without matter, without nature, without having 
been born, how does the philosopher think and speak? How do Being and beings come into 
appearance? Is birth not the first, and in fact only, passage into Being and thinking? For Irigaray, 
mother-nature-matter is that which gives herself endlessly without return, but her ceaseless giving is 
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replaced by the gift that has always already been given without a giver.46 Western metaphysics is 
therefore founded on a constitutive matri-cide: an elimination of the mother and of matter. To 
recover the vital materiality of physis means also to recover the “debt of life” to she who gave and 
gives it: mother-nature-matter.  
This matricide at the origin of metaphysics leads to the metaphysical oblivion of the sexuate 
other. In pre-philosophical Greece, as in many other cultures, the cosmos was fundamentally divided 
in terms of sexuate difference. For instance, ancient Greek nouns, according to Cornelia Tsakiridou, 
are gendered not merely in a grammatical or logical sense (as in Latinate languages) but rather 
ontologically. In other words, it is not that certain nouns are associated with certain gendered norms but 
rather that they arise from and express a particular sexuate relationship to the world. Gender 
functions in ancient Greek, Tsakiridou writes, “as a sensual catalog of the human lifeworld.”47 Thus, 
feminine words—e.g., physis, genesis, poiesis, arkhe—express patterns and relationships that have 
“natural equivalents or analogs” with feminine morphology, sexuality, and life processes, such as 
internalization, fluidity, embodiment, birth, materiality (and the reciprocal for masculine words).48 
This means that the way that phenomena were designated in language—not just in the name, but in 
                                                     
46 As Irigaray uses air as a synecdoche for the forgotten elemental materiality, she uses it also to 
recover the forgotten mother-nature-matter: “She gives [Elle donne]—first—air, and does so 
irrecoverably, with the exception of the unfolding, from and within her, of whoever takes air from 
her. While this air is—first—fluid matter carried by the blood she gives, it can also be understood as 
voice and phenomenon. These issue from it and are the possibility—ever material—of naming-
demonstrating, of appearing in presence. She gives first. She gives the possibility of that beginning 
from which the whole of man will be constituted. This gift received with no possibility of a return. 
He cannot pay her back in kind” (Above at 28). The use of the singular pronoun “elle” throughout 
Irigaray’s later works is meant to signify a sort of consubstantiality of the referents: mother, nature, 
matter, woman. Similar to Trinitarian theology, these are distinct yet are of the same “substance” (or 
lack thereof) as configured within metaphysics.  
47 Cornelia A Tsakiridou, “Philosophy Abandons Woman: Gender, Orality, and Some Literate Pre-
Socratics,” in Emanuela Bianchi (ed) Is Feminist Philosophy Philosophy? (Northwestern University Press 
1999) 248.  
48 Above at 234. 
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the experience and delimitation of the phenomena itself—reflects a specifically sexuate mode of 
Being. For example, the feminine word for “language,” glossa, emphasizes an embodied dimension of 
speech (i.e., the tongue), while the masculine word logos is more abstract, placing the emphasis on the 
utterance itself. In pre-literate Greek, then, the feminine and the masculine are two orientations 
toward the world, arising from particular relational and morphological contexts, with each serving as 
the limit and horizon of the other, and the interaction between the two producing the total reality of 
the Greek cosmos. As such, dialogue is a relation of desire for a perspective on the whole.49 According to 
Tsakiridou, the emergence of Greek literacy signals the collapse of this sexuate cosmos. Reading the 
earliest written texts in the philosophical tradition—the fragments of Anaximander, Parmenides, and 
Heraclitus—what Tsakiridou observes is not, as is commonly held, the first attempt at a “rational” 
understanding of the cosmos but rather the first description of the cosmos without sexuate difference. When 
the philosopher becomes the arkhe of his own text, language becomes monologic and thus loses its 
embeddedness in the sensual (and sexuate) realities of living. An entirely new experience of the 
world therefore becomes possible: like the text, the cosmos itself becomes represented as a singular 
totality, without birth (genesis), detached from the vital materiality of nature, mother, and the sexuate 
living body. And because the feminine no longer functions as a limit-horizon, the sexuate other is no 
longer necessary in order to have a perspective on the whole, for the singular logos can gather all. It is 
                                                     
49 “[T]he feminine is not only a grammatical structure. It is also a certain intuition of world and a way 
of directing myself in it…In that context, it makes sense to say that the masculine becomes a limit, 
an encompassing intuition of otherness in things—similar to what the phenomenologists like to call 
a horizon. Within that horizon and its dynamics, a multiplicity of relations is possible which invokes 
but also challenges that limit. The same applies to the other side: the function of the feminine as a 
horizon for the masculine. The interaction of these two horizons produces the space delineated by 
the total reality of the Greek language—I can put this in a somewhat poetic way by calling that 
reality the Greek cosmos…[Greek] can speak from the body’s other and from the difference of its 
desire toward the whole world” (Tsakiridou as above at 238 and 248). 
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this neutered cosmos, i.e., “Being itself,” that will become the cosmos of metaphysics.50 Once the 
feminine has been removed as a limit, the masculine perspective becomes the whole cosmos (i.e., 
“Being itself”); and yet, in order to present itself as neuter, the feminine must be actively annihilated. In 
this, the horizon of Being, or what lies beyond the limits of the world of the philosopher-physicist, 
becomes Non-Being or Nothing, rather than Being-as-Other.51 Within this neutered cosmos, natural 
differences are supplanted by logical dualisms that only simulate difference within a logos that can 
speak only of and to the Same. Without a birth and without her, without difference, this Being can only 
be a Being oriented toward Nothing: a “Being-toward-death.” Framed by death and by the Nothing, 
how could this neutered Being unfold as anything other than the nihilism of planetary technicity?   
 As the nihilation of Being in western metaphysics nevertheless remains a determination of 
Being, the desexuation of the cosmos nevertheless remains a sexuate cosmos for if there is any point 
that Irigaray has made clear in her oeuvre, it is that so-called neutrality is nothing but an alibi for the 
reign of the masculine. Thus, while the written text and philosophical thought enabled the 
neutralization of cosmology, the experience of the world codified there was not neutral, but 
specifically masculine. Indeed, as Tsakiridou notes, it is not that a new, neutral vocabulary was 
invented to express this new, neuter cosmology; rather what was new was that this cosmology was 
expressed in an entirely masculine vocabulary, with the feminine no longer being necessary to 
                                                     
50 As Irigaray puts it: “In order to definitively close the logos upon itself, in order for the logos to speak 
with itself, the traces of a relation with her are said in the neuter. For example, On in the singular is 
used to designate the totality of beings—there is On—and the beings are named onta—there are onta. 
Instead of saying: the world is born from her, and from my relation with her, the Western 
philosopher says: there is [it gives, Es gibt] Being, there are beings, which is, or are, without anyone 
who gives. There is, there are, without being born in a way, without any origin. There is, there are, 
mysteriously there. With the neutralization of his own being and of the whole of the universe, the 
Presocratic philosopher somehow prepares our tradition for nihilism.” Irigaray, In the Beginning, She 
Was (Continuum 2013) 4.  
51 As Heidegger writes of Parmenides: “Inasmuch as Being has to be distinguished from an Other 
and reinforced as physis, Being is distinguished from not-Being” (above note 42 at 115). 
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express the whole. In philosophical texts, words that had once expressed a sexuate experience of the 
world became “asexual and asomatic beings” and this de-materialization and de-sexuation of 
language and experience enabled the masculine world to present itself as neutral truth or reality, 
while the feminine world was silenced.52 Logos, for instance, was no longer a distinctly masculine 
experience of language that coexisted with glossa, but rather became language itself. And because, as 
Irigaray argues, the logos is the architectonics of metaphysics, metaphysics is isomorphic with the 
masculine world. Western metaphysics, that is to say, is techno-phal-logo-centric: it is the technical 
reconstruction of the world in the image or form of Man through the logos.53 For Irigaray, Man is 
therefore “essentially technocratic,” for with the banishment of birth (genesis) and living material nature 
(phusis) from his cosmos, tekhne would be the only mode of Being available to him.54 As the necessary 
condition of all Being and thinking, without any place of her own within this metaphysics, she 
(mother-nature-matter-woman) is always already positioned—having been plundered—as the 
standing reserve out of which Man builds his dwelling. Through her famous psychoanalysis of the 
unconscious of western philosophy, Irigaray therefore reveals that in the same way that the barring 
of the relation to the mother forms the unconscious ground upon which phallic subjectivity is 
erected, the burial of “mother-matter” forms the “mute soil” of meta-physics.55 By displacing (1) 
                                                     
52 Tsakiridou above note 46 at 248. 
53 “Language [le langage] would be the technology—the architechnology, the architectonics—for 
man’s fashioning the living according to his sexual project” (Irigaray above note 43 at 91). Thus, as 
Claire Colebrook points out, it is not that Irigaray merely associates the history of metaphysics with 
“masculine values,” but that metaphysics signifies a sexuately “specific relation to Being,” that of 
phallogocentrism. Claire Colebrook, “Feminist Philosophy and the Philosophy of Feminism: Irigaray 
and the History of Western Metaphysics” (1997) 12(1) Hypatia at 86. 
54 Irigaray as above at 90.  
55 In Speculum, Irigaray reads the history of philosophy in specifically psychoanalytic terms, to which I 
refer with my choice of language here. In Lacan’s theorization of the phallic symbolic, the originary 
“fusion” (or so it is understood in psychoanalysis) with the mother must necessarily be severed and 
barred by the phallic signifier in order for the subject to constitute himself as such within the 
symbolic order. This barred relation to the mother cannot be given symbolic representation except 
through metaphoric substitutions and metonymic displacements. The maternal-feminine is therefore 
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birth, (2) vital materiality, and (3) sexuate other(s) from his cosmos, the Being of Man has always been 
a death project, a violent conquest of her that is oriented only toward Nothing. As Irigaray writes:  
This would be the “as such” [soi-même] of western man: the effect of a mastery, of a violent 
domination over the natural universe and not of a respect for, a contemplation of, a praise 
for, or an alliance with it. The history constructed by man resembles a history of enduring 
violence, of appropriation, of domination…Man has created, invented, and given to nature 
not so much because he was more than her, but because he wished to tame her. It this not, 
perhaps, because he was less than her?…The Being of man is constituted thanks to the limit 
of death: he has nothing which can overcome it. The fact remains that man places himself 
here on earth in a circle woven of violence and terror, thus closing every opening.56 
 
Here, the world becomes nothing more than the sum total of Man’s technical ordering powers. In 
other words, what Heidegger calls the “conquest” of the world as Man’s picture is the “grounding 
event” not, as he would have it, of modernity but of metaphysics. Detached from living materiality or 
nature in its difference, the world of metaphysics becomes synonymous with the techno-logically 
positioned world of Man in which to be is to be an object of Man’s re-presentation (beyond which is 
simply Nothing). On Irigaray’s reading, then, the age of planetary technicity is the culmination of the 
metaphysics of technophallogocentrism.     
 
5. A Chance for Life: Sexuate Difference and Decoloniality  
Irigaray and Heidegger offer what are arguably the two most incisive Eurocentric critiques of 
western philosophy, enabling us to understand the modern world in its ontological and metaphysical 
foundations. Through their work we can understand planetary technicity as a metaphysical death project 
                                                     
represented as the undifferentiated ground (i.e., “the Real” in Lacanian terms) against which the 
phallic barrier must be erected in order to prevent the subject from falling into the black hole of 
psychosis. Irigaray argues that this phallic imaginary subtends the entire history of metaphysics, 
which for lack of finding symbolic representation for the maternal function, has erected an onto-
theological and phallic barrier against what it takes as undifferentiated materiality. This materiality 
can then only resurface in metaphors and metonymies, or as a traumatic return of the Real.          
56 Luce Irigaray, To Be Two (trans Monique Rhodes and Marco Cocito-Monoc) (Routledge 2001) 71-
4. 
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that consists of the substitution of a singular techno-logically ordered world for living nature in its 
material difference. Through this process of “denaturation,” all beings (including humans) are 
withdrawn from their vital, material, morphological becoming and gathered in a universal standing 
reserve of resources that can be put to whatever use. In such a world, any difference is the result of 
the production of value out of general equivalence and all relations are technically mediated inter-
actions driven by calculative, accumulative, instrumental rationality. According to Heidegger and 
Irigaray, it is only within the context of such a metaphysics that capitalism, colonization, and 
globalization can arise. As such, any fundamental challenge to these systems must proceed by way of 
another thinking of Being than the onto-logic of planetary technicity. While for Heidegger, the reach 
of technical rationality is so exhaustive that the only remaining possibility is what he called a 
“commemorative thinking” that reflects on the oblivion of Being while preparing a place for “its” 
return, Irigaray’s critical engagement with Heidegger reveals that even more than Being, life is the 
unthought condition of western metaphysics that remains in reserve within it. For Irigaray, then, the 
only possible challenge to the reign of planetary technicity is the “reawakening of life”: 
In order to go beyond a conception of the world that a technical way of thinking and 
behaving governs, we must discover another frame or structure thanks to which human 
beings may escape such domination while acknowledging and interpreting the nature of its 
power. We must free ourselves from the technical and scientific ascendance over our epoch 
and ensure the safeguarding of meaning by a new incarnation of being. In reality, the 
meaning that we must consider and cultivate in our epoch is first that of life itself.57  
 
According to Irigaray, rebuilding the world beyond the metaphysics of technophallogcentrism 
requires beginning again from life itself as an ultimate and irreducible value. Within such a 
framework, Being and thinking would cultivate what life is in its morphological specificities, which 
would prevent the gathering of everything that is into a standing reserve of general equivalence. Life, 
as Irigaray puts it, is nonnegotiable: once it is not cultivated in itself, it is already appropriated by the 
                                                     
57 Luce Irigaray, To Be Born (Palgrave 2017) 88. 
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death project.58 Here, Irigaray is aligned with indigenous activists, such as the ACÍN, who see the 
affirmation of life as the only possible resistance to the global death project because only life can be 
an end in itself: “Life can never be a means to another end, and even less to that of accumulation. 
Life is the only end….There are two opposed projects: the death project and the plans of life.”59  
 It is the question of an ontology of life that can therefore ground a decolonial feminist 
challenge to the death project of planetary technicity. While the question of life has been a growing 
concern in recent feminist theory, it is often approached by way of seeking a closer engagement with 
the sciences.60 However, “life” as it is understood within the sciences is ultimately a technical object 
and, as such, cannot ground any alternative to planetary technicity. While this certainly does not 
mean opposing the sciences, it does mean that feminist theory must generate its own concepts of life 
instead of drawing them from the resources of technophallogocentrism. In this sense, an 
engagement with intellectual heritages that have resisted and survived the imperialism of planetary 
technicity is indispensable. Indeed, even Irigaray argues that because “life can never be treated as an 
object, our culture [i.e., Eurocentric thought] does not supply us with a method to answer” the 
question of how to cultivate life itself.61 And yet, this is where the question of sexuate difference 
becomes an inextricable dimension of this project. As Irigaray’s work demonstrates, the death 
project of planetary technicity is accomplished through the ontological annihilation of birth and 
sexuate difference that enables the entire cosmos to be molded isomorphically with (western) Man’s 
imaginary and desires (themselves often unconscious). Again, Irigaray’s claim here is not the same as 
the relatively common anthropological-historical argument (initiated by JJ Bachofen and Friedrich Engels 
                                                     
58 As above note 1.  
59 As above note 17. 
60 See Hasana Sharp and Chloe Taylor (eds) Feminist Philosophies of Life (McGill-Queen’s University 
Press 2016). 
61 As above note 1. 
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and developed in much “second wave” feminist scholarship) that the overthrow of “mother right” 
and the subordination of women is the basis for all subsequent systems of exploitation including 
colonization and capitalism. It is, rather, a philosophical argument that the ontology—the specific a priori 
determination of Being—that subtends colonization and capitalism, that is planetary technicity-
coloniality, is the culmination of the metaphysics of technophallogocentrism which begin with the 
ontological annihilation of sexuate difference and material-maternal generativity. It is on the basis of this 
annihilation that the fabricated world of technicity has been constructed—a fabricated world that, 
once again, is not neutral, but is essentially phallomorphic. For Irigaray, because the entire technical-
colonial onto-logic is structured and systematized by a symmetry that is constitutively incapable of 
recognizing living difference, we are not able to approach indigenous thought as different—what 
Viveiros de Castro calls “Being-as-Other”—without appropriating it to the metaphysics of the Same 
unless we are able to live and think sexuate difference. It is for this reason that Irigaray has 
controversially insisted that, in the age of globalization, sexuate difference is necessary in order to be 
able to meet and respect and differences between cultures and to cultivate a shared world without 
the imperialism of western onto-logic.62 While Irigaray has often been critiqued for universalizing a 
specifically Eurocentric formation of sex/gender, her work is, to my mind, actually quite consonant 
with the work of decolonial feminist theorists. For instance, in her critique of Quijano, María 
Lugones has shown that the coloniality of power and Being did not merely shape existing patterns of 
sexuality and gender but were themselves imposed in and through Eurocentric norms of sexuality 
and gender, often introducing sex and gender as sociopolitical categories where they were not 
                                                     
62 See, for example, “Toward a Mutual Hospitality” in Thomas Claviez (ed) The Conditions of 
Hospitality: Ethics, Politics and Aesthetics on the Threshold of the Possible (Fordham University Press 2013) 
42-54 and A New Culture of Energy: Beyond East and West (trans Stephen D Seely) (Columbia 
University Press 2017). 
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previously operative.63 As she argues, this was done through the destruction of indigenous 
cosmologies in Africa and the Americas that had their own erotic choreographies that were often 
not limited to binary notions of gender and sexuality restricted to individualized and bounded bodies 
categorized by reproductive function and genitalia. This understanding of sexuality and gender, 
however, is itself a product of the onto-logic of technicity in which sex and gender are technical 
objects always already detached from vital, material difference64—an understanding which, as 
discussed above, is itself constructed on the obliteration of pre-philosophical Greece’s sexuate 
cosmology. Thus, when Irigaray claims that “all traditions that remain faithful to the cosmic take 
account of natural powers in sexuate terms,” or when she suggests that an attunement to sexuate 
difference is necessary in order to be able to affirm any other differences, she is not seeking to make 
Eurocentric sex/gender formations—which she herself challenges since the beginning of her work 
as a “regime of sexual indifference”—a transhistorical universal and the basis and priority of any 
global feminism.65 Instead, her point is for those of us within the onto-logic of 
technophallogentrism: because our metaphysics is grounded in an annihilation of life and sexuate 
difference, we must work this out before we can have any non-appropriative encounter with nature 
or with the other, any relation-in-difference that is capable of respecting life itself without imposing 
our own (physical or logical) forms on it. This is why, in her post-Chernobyl address in which she 
argues that the global death project of planetary technicity is a sexuate project, she insists that a new 
ontology, ethics, and politics of sexuate difference is “a chance for life.”             
                                                     
63 María Lugones, “Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System” (2007) 22(1) Hypatia 
186-209 and “Toward a Decolonial Feminism” (2010) 25(4) 742-59. 
64 This technical-scientific understanding of sex/uality is what Foucault theorizes as the Scientia 
sexualis  and the “dispositif of sexuality” which “grips bodies in their materiality, their forces, energies, 
sensations, and pleasures.” See The History of Sexuality Volume One (trans Robert Hurley) Vintage 
Books 1990) 155. 
65 Luce Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies (trans Gillian Gill) (Columbia University Press 1993) 108. 
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By way of conclusion, then, I would like to offer one example of a decolonial response to 
the global death project that is grounded in a sexuate cosmology: that of the Kogi people of the 
mountains of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta near the Caribbean coast in northern Colombia. The 
Kogi are descendants of the Tairona cultures who had already moved from the coast into the 
mountains by the time of Spanish invasion and therefore escaped the total decimation that was the 
fate of so many other indigenous peoples, making them one of the most intact pre-Columbian 
cultures.66 Although the Kogi live in accordance with their ancient practices (including choosing not 
to adopt writing or learning Spanish) and do not welcome outsiders, in the late 1980s they contacted 
BBC filmmaker Alan Ereira telling him they have a message for the western world, which they refer 
to as the “Little Brother.” This message, offered at the same time that scientific hypotheses about 
climate change first began to be taken seriously in the global north, warned of impending ecological 
catastrophe, increasing geopolitical unrest, and serious heath crises. According to them, this is 
happening because the death project of planetary technicity has forgotten our common Mother and 
thus mutilates the Earth without understanding its essential interconnection. Given that we 
obviously did not heed their message and their predictions came true, they reached out to Ereira 
again to give their “final warning” in the documentary Alúna (2012). Because there is so little time 
left, in this film, unlike the first, they focus on actually teaching their cosmology and scientific 
practices so that we can better grasp their ecological message.  
The Kogi cosmology is extremely complex and can be presented in both “philosophical-
scientific” and “mythological-religious” forms, “both” of which are centered on the Great Mother. 
In her meta/physical form, the Mother is called alúna, which is the fundamental and incorporeal life-
force of the universe, generative energy, concentrated thought, the intelligence of Being: 
                                                     
66 The other three descendants of the Tairona (who also live in the Santa Marta) are the Arhuaco, 
Kankuamo, and Wiwa. 
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Alúna contains everything which is past and everything that may become. Alúna is 
intelligence; it is the concentrated thought and memory which forms a bridge between the 
human ‘spirit’ and the universe, but it also the hidden world of forces which govern the 
world’s fertility. Alúna makes possible growth, birth, and sexuality; it is the ‘spiritual’ energy 
that makes things happen. If it did not, the world would be sterile. It would never have 
begun. Alúna was and is the Mother.67  
 
By dividing herself between memory and possibility, the Mother ceaselessly gives birth to material 
reality, which exists only in the present, teetering on the threshold of the immaterial past and future 
in a constant process of creative (re)generation.68 Unlike in western cosmology, ancient and modern 
alike, the origin was not an unruly and undifferentiated chaos that would need to be ordered by a 
God, a demiurge, a logos, or a rational subject who would cut us off from mother-nature. The 
Mother always was and, as in pregnancy, even before giving birth there is morphological 
differentiation within her. Based on this, the Kogi view the entire cosmos as living; indeed, they refer 
to the cosmos as the “fabric of life” (alúna zakwa) which is woven by the Mother on a cosmic loom 
using the thread of alúna. Alúna is thus the incorporeal tissue out of which the material flesh is made. 
This cosmic fabric, moreover, is sexuate: the warp threads are feminine (Seynekun), giving the fabric 
its structure, form, and strength, while the weft threads are masculine (Seranwka) which give the 
fabric its pattern, appearance, and texture. In this fabric, every “point” in the cosmos, every pick in the 
weave, is a meeting between masculine and feminine and thus every being has a “mother” and a 
                                                     
67 Alan Ereira, The Elder Brothers’ Warning (Tairona Heritage Trust 2008) 110-1. Ereira’s text is written 
in collaboration with Ramòn Gil, who as one of the few Kogi fluent in Spanish acts as a sort of 
spokesman. See also, “The Law of Sé: Linking the Spiritual and the Material,” which is Gil’s 
presentation of the Kogi cosmology translated by Ereira with an exegesis that situates it in relation 
to western concepts in Barbara Hoffman (ed) Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy, and Practice 
(Cambridge University Press 2006) 21-7. Ereira notes that although the Kogi have never been 
converted to Catholicism (it is in no way a “syncretic religion”), Colombian Spanish itself carries its 
own Catholic “baggage” and that Gil’s use of certain words like “spiritual” should be understood 
with this in mind. 
68 As they describe it, in order to give birth to the physical present, the mother split the past 
(“memory”) and the future (“possibility”), which are not physical and are not split in the non-
physical realm (Sé). The physical present is thus situated in a sort of vaginal opening between the 
past and the future which remain in continuous contact like lips. 
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“father.”69 For the Kogi, this macrocosmic ordering principle also structures microcosm, for every 
element of social life including language is “constructed out of the partnership of masculine and 
feminine, the dynamic process of weaving on the loom of life.”70  
 Again, however, the Kogis’ cosmology is not only mythological, and is not at all 
some form of “irrational superstition.” For them, on the contrary, material reality is underpinned by 
a complex yet ordered immaterial axiomatic infrastructure, Sé, which includes everything that exists 
(but much more than materially exists) and is bound to material reality by the thread of alúna. Sé is not 
a transcendent “realm,” but the incorporeal sense and structure of Being. Because alúna is both 
concentrated thought and life-force, and because material life and consciousness are therefore a sort 
of dilated alúna, humans can access Sé through concentrated thought.71 This, as one might guess, is 
no small feat and, indeed, can generally only be done by the Mamas, who are the Kogi’s scientists, 
philosophers, physicians, lawyers, and spiritual leaders—i.e., the keepers of the “Law of Sé.” Because 
                                                     
69 Indeed, even their technical artefacts are sexuate: “The idea of the balance between the masculine 
and the feminine runs through the whole of Kogi life, not just their sexual mores. Thus you cannot 
build a bridge, a hut, a loom, or construct a path that winds through a village without the 
masculine/feminine principle being explicitly represented in some way” (See “Women in Kogi 
Society,” http://tairona.myzen.co.uk/index.php/culture/women_in_kogi_society). As with Irigaray, 
they see the technology of the western world as part of the death project because it is constructed 
without involving the generative principle of sexual difference and is therefore detached from life 
and meaningless: “The Kogi perceive life in many things which are in our understanding inanimate; 
any object which has meaning and purpose in the world…must be sustained by a balance of sexual 
forces, by its own Mother and Father” (Ereira above note 66 at 84). 
70 Ereira above note 66 at 92. Because of the fundamentality of sexual difference to their culture, 
Ereira asked Gil about homosexuality to which he responded that although it is uncommon (and 
that he had never tried it), it is not considered unnatural and that there are even cases of homosexual 
marriage, including a story of two women who lived together as wives who were very insistent that 
sex between women is “far superior” (see Ereira above note 66 at 131-3).  
71 As Gil describes it, “The original laws, the fundamental principles, are in Sé….Sé is not a person, 
not a thing. It is the sum of things. Sé is complex…There are many different forms of existence; one 
is the material world that arose from Sé but there is much more that exists only in spirit….[Sé] has 
no corporeal being—no body, no organs.” The four axioms or principles of Sé (also referred to by 
Gil as “parents”) are: the concept of order, the concept of materiality, the concept of time (memory, 
present, and possibility), and the concept of sexual difference. Ereira notes that the word “spirit” is 
misleading and that Sé could also be called “cosmic intelligence” (Gil as above note 66 at 21-4).  
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the material world is an interconnected whole of nearly infinite complexity, but is embedded in a 
rational structure, the Kogi see it as absolutely mandatory—not to mention completely logical—that 
any thinking, and certainly any physical intervention, involve the incorporeal intelligence of the 
cosmos as a “partner”72 In their view, then, while the science of the Younger Brother proclaims itself 
as the pinnacle of rational thinking, it is deeply limited and illogical because in attaining the stance of 
exteriority by which it surveys the world (especially through technological apparatuses), it has 
actually severed its direct thread to the sense of the cosmos and can therefore only infer this structure 
through the observation and calculation of visible effects within isolated regions of the physical 
world.73 They have recognized, however, that if their message is to be heeded, Younger Brother will 
need proof of what they are saying and thus they have recently met with a number of professional 
scientists, including astrophysicists, ecologists, marine biologists, and zoologists who have been 
stunned by their “cutting-edge” knowledge. For instance, they have demonstrated systematic 
understanding of some of the most complex and recent areas of western scientific research: regions 
of deep space impossible to observe without the most sophisticated telescopic instruments, the 
relativity of time and space, nonlocality, systems ecology, symbiogenesis, deep time, climate change, 
and, even “dark matter.” This has been profound enough that the Colombian government has—
along with Spain, ironically—sought their council on new environmental initiatives and practices.  
                                                     
72 Gil as above note 66 at 23.  
73 Ereira writes that his occasional attempts to explain events in the news, such as debates about 
nuclear weapons, during his stays with the Kogi “were regarded as baffling and irrelevant. What 
difference does it make if we do not destroy the world in one way, when we are about to destroy it 
in another?” (178). Given the incredibly brief history of western technological science in comparison 
to their knowledge, they see our extreme pride in our science as short-sighted: “We are, to them, like 
people who have jumped off of a mountain and, falling fast, are proclaiming our ability to fly” (64). 
When speaking to the professional scientists in the film, the Mamas often seem extremely frustrated 
by the slow pace of our realizations, looking baffled when the scientists tell them about tentative 
research into and new “discoveries” of things they already know (esp. climate change and systems 
ecology). They think that our scientific burden of proof combined with our unwillingness to take 
any other knowledge practices seriously is endangering the entire planet.    
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 Heidegger, Irigaray, and the Kogi—each in their own way, no doubt—thus pose serious and 
direct challenges to western science and technology regarding its complicity in the death project of 
western Man, challenges that should especially not be ignored by feminist theorists working to 
rethink the relationship between the humanities and sciences. Although, unlike Heidegger, the most 
important resonance between Irigaray’s philosophy and the Kogi cosmology is their affirmation of life 
against the cosmic Being-toward-death of western metaphysics. To be sure, Heidegger’s 
“preparatory thinking” was an indispensable contribution to the opening of a path beyond the Ge-
Stell of modern technological-scientific imperialism; however, his own forgetting of life meant that 
“thinking,” for him, could never leave the shelter of the House of Language. With Irigaray and the 
Kogi, on the other hand, the walls of the (t)autological circle of Being and thinking give way to a 
process of living in which perception and thinking are modes of participation in the life of the cosmos 
rather than the logical re-presentation, calculation, and ordering of a mechanical universe: a 
reciprocal (yet asymmetrical) partnership with the Mother as the Kogi describe it, or a sym-pathos or 
com-passion rather than an overcoming of mother-matter as Irigaray puts it. As the Being of Man 
hurtles to its “ownmost possibility” (i.e., death writ large), we are faced with a life and death choice.74 
This, of course, is something that colonized peoples have known all along, and as more and more 
people are realizing, it is perhaps to them that we must look for guidance in saving life itself. Such a 
project, no doubt, entails an enormous amount of ontological work on our part to even be able to 
comprehend such guidance. And yet this is an undertaking that we cannot afford not to take on. The 
Mother is dying, the Kogi are trying desperately to tell us. And she wants to know, they say, 
“whether we are going to help Her or just take pictures.”75 Within European thought it is Irigaray 
                                                     
74 Heidegger famously calls death Dasein’s “ownmost potentiality-of-being” in Being and Time (trans 
Joan Stambaugh) (The State University of New York Press 2007) 241. 
75 Aluna (directed by Alan Ereira, Sunstone Films, 2012) 
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who has most ceaselessly tied the death project of Man to the originary and ongoing matricide that 
constitutes the metaphysics of technicity. And it is because of her raising of the profound questions 
about what kind of work with respect to sexuate difference we would have to do to end this 
matricide, let alone to actually recompense and assist the Mother, that in this essay I have placed 
Irigaray between god and the Indians. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
     
 
